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Abstract
The overlapping expectations and the collective absence of arbitrage con-
ditions introduced in the economic literature to insure existence of Pareto
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overlapping sets of priors and the Pareto equilibrium conditions introduced
by Heath and Ku for coherent risk measures are respectively reinterpreted
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1 Introduction
The problem of the existence and characterization of Pareto optima and equi-
libria in markets with short-selling, has recently been addressed by Barrieu
and El Karoui [4], Jouini et al [14], Filipovic and Kupper [8] and Burgert
and Ru¨schendorf [6] for convex measures of risk in infinite markets. Existence
of an equilibrium for finite markets with short-selling is an old problem in
the economic literature. It has first been considered in the early seventies by
Grandmont [10], Hart [12] and Green [11] since Debreu’s standard theorems on
existence of equilibrium could not be applied, investors’ sets of portfolios be-
ing unbounded below. In these early papers, investors were assumed to hold a
single homogeneous or heterogeneous probabilistic belief and be von Neumann-
Morgenstern risk averse utility maximizers. Two sufficient conditions for exis-
tence of an equilibrium were given:
- the overlapping expectations condition which expresses that investors are suf-
ficiently similar in their beliefs and risk tolerances so that there exists a non
empty set of prices (the no-arbitrage prices) for which no agent can make cost-
less unbounded utility nondecreasing purchases
-the no unbounded utility arbitrage condition, a collective absence of arbitrage
condition, which requires that investors do not engage in mutually compatible,
utility nondecreasing trades.
These conditions have later been weakened and shown to be equivalent un-
der adequate conditions and under further assumptions, necessary for existence
of equilibrium (see e.g. Page [17], Page and Wooders [19]). They have been
generalized to abstract economies (see Werner [22] and Nielsen [15]). Other
sufficient conditions were given. For a review of the subject in finite dimension,
see Allouch et al [1], Dana et al [7], Page [16],[18]. The theory has also been
developed for infinite markets but the conditions given above do not generalize
to the infinite dimension (see for example Brown and Werner [5]) and it is in
general difficult to provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of an economy
to have an equilibrium.
This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Pareto optima and
equilibria when agents use convex measures of risk in finite markets with short-
selling. In contrast, with the papers of Barrieu and El Karoui [4] who deal
with families of ρ-dilated risk measures and Jouini et al [14] who consider law
invariant convex monetary utilities, it makes no specific assumptions on the
risk measures. However it assumes that there is a finite number of states of the
world and uses finite dimensional convex analysis techniques. It builds on one
hand, on the economic literature on equilibrium with short-selling and on the
other hand on a paper by Heath and Ku [13]. Heath and Ku [13]introduced a
condition now on denoted HKPE that they called the Pareto equilibrium con-
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dition which requires that if investors do engage in mutually compatible, utility
nondecreasing trades, then those trades do not increase their utilities. They
showed, for a subclass of measures of risk, the equivalence between HKPE and
an overlapping sets of priors condition (see their proposition 4.2). They how-
ever did not address the question of existence of Pareto optima and equilibria.
This paper makes two main contributions. The first is to relate Heath and
Ku’s HKPE and overlapping sets of priors condition to a weakening of the no
unbounded utility arbitrage condition and to a weakening of the no-arbitrage
price condition mentionned above. The second is to show that these condi-
tions are sufficient conditions for existence of Pareto optima and Arrow Debreu
equilibria. Two types of proof are provided, one uses the sup-convolution, the
other applies standard results in the theory of equilibrium with short-selling.
Following Heath and Ku [13], the case of constraints is also considered.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and recall
concepts in equilibrium theory. Two concepts of Pareto optima are introduced,
one for complete preferences represented by measures of risk, the other for
incomplete preferences associated to agents’ priors. Section 3 contains the main
results of the paper, the equivalence between HKPE and an overlapping sets of
priors condition. These conditions are then shown to be sufficient for existence
of an efficient allocation. A first proof of existence of efficient allocations is
given by using the sup-convolution. Finally necessary conditions for existence
of an efficient allocation are given. Section 4 relates the overlapping sets of priors
condition and HKPE to the theory of arbitrage and equilibrium. Another proof
of existence of efficient allocations and equilibria based on general equilibrium
techniques is provided. Section 5 deals with the case of constraints on trades.
2 The model
We consider a standard Arrow-Debreu model of complete contingent security
markets. There are two dates, 0 and 1. At date 0, there is uncertainty about
which state s from a state space Ω = {1, ..., k} will occur at date 1. At date
0, agents trade contingent claims for date 1. The space of contingent claims
is the set of random variables from Ω → R. The random variable X which
equals x1 in state 1, x2 in state 2 and xk in state k, is identified with the
vector X = (x1, . . . , xk). Let 4 = {pi ∈ Rk+ :
∑k
s=1 pis = 1} be the prob-
ability simplex in Rk and pi ∈ 4. We note Epi(X) :=
∑k
l=1 pilxl and for
p ∈ Rk, p ·X :=∑kl=1 plxl.
There are m agents indexed by i = 1, . . . ,m. Agent i has an endowment
Ei ∈ Rk of contingent claims. Let E =∑mi=1Ei denote aggregate endowment.
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We assume that each agent has a preference order i over Rk represented by a
monetary utility function V i where we recall that
Definition 1 A function V : Rk → R is a monetary utility function if it is
concave monotone and has the cash invariance property
V (X + C) = V (X) + C, for any X ∈ Rk, C constant
A positively homogeneous monetary utility function is a monetary utility func-
tion that is positively homogeneous.
Monetary utility functions can be identified with convex measures of risk
(see Fo¨llmer and Schied [9]) and positively homogeneous monetary utility func-
tions with coherent risk measures(see Artzner et al [2]) by defining ρ = −V .
We recall that monetary utility functions have the following representation
V (X) = min
pi∈4
Epi(X) + c(pi) (1)
where
c(pi) = sup
X∈Rk
V (X)− Epi(X) ∈ R ∪ {+∞} (2)
which is convex, lower semi-continuous, is the conjuguate function of V . Let
P = dom c = {pi ∈ 4 | c(pi) <∞} (3)
be the set of effective priors associated with V . Clearly, we also have:
V (X) = min
pi∈P
Epi(X) + c(pi) (4)
Positively homogeneous monetary utility functions are obtained when c is
an indicator function δP (in other words, c(pi) = 0 if pi ∈ P and c(pi) = ∞
otherwise). In that case, P = {pi ∈ 4 : c(pi) = 0} is a convex compact subset
of 4 and we have V (X) = minpi∈P Epi(X).
We next recall standard concepts in equilibrium theory.
An allocation (Xi)mi=1 ∈ (Rk)m is attainable if
∑m
i=1X
i = E.
A trade (W i)mi=1 ∈ (Rk)m is feasible if
∑m
i=1W
i = 0.
The set of individually rational attainable allocations A is defined by
A =
{
(Xi)mi=1 ∈ (Rk)m |
m∑
i=1
Xi = E and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei) for all i
}
.
Definition 2 An attainable allocation (Xi)mi=1 is Pareto optimal if there exists
no feasible trade (W i)mi=1 such that V
i(Xi+W i) ≥ Vi(Xi) for all i with a strict
inequality for some i. It is individually rational Pareto optimal if it is Pareto
optimal and V i(Xi) ≥ V i(Ei) for all i.
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Definition 3 A pair (X∗, p∗) ∈ A × Rk\{0} is a contingent Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium if
1. for each agent i and Xi ∈ Rk, V i(Xi) > V (Xi∗) implies p∗ ·Xi > p∗ ·Xi∗,
2. for each agent i, p∗ ·Xi∗ = p∗ · Ei.
Assertions 1 and 2 express thatXi∗ solves investor’s imaximization problem
at price p∗. Markets clear since X∗ is attainable.
We also define a weaker concept of Pareto optimality under incomplete pref-
erences. Let P be a set of priors. Consider the following incomplete preferences
on pairs (X,Y ) ∈ Rk × Rk defined by
X P Y iff Epi(X) ≥ Epi(Y ) for all pi ∈ P (5)
Given P = (P i)mi=1 a family of set of priors, an attainable allocation (Xi)mi=1 is
P-Pareto optimal if there exists no feasible trade (W i)mi=1 such that Epi(Xi +
W i) ≥ Epi(Xi) for all i and all pi ∈ P i with a strict inequality for some i and
some pi ∈ P i. Equivalently:
HKPE: there exists no feasible trade (W i)mi=1 such that Epi(W
i) ≥ 0 for all i
and all pi ∈ P i with a strict inequality for some i and some pi ∈ P i.
Hence, for m incomplete preferences defined by (5), either HKPE is fulfilled
and any attainable allocation is P-Pareto optimal or HKPE is not fulfilled and
there exists no P-Pareto optimal allocation.
3 Existence of efficient allocations and equilibria
Given a convex subset A ⊆ Rp, the relative interior of A, ri A, is the interior
which results when A is regarded as a subset of its affine hull aff A.
3.1 Heath and Ku’s Pareto equilibrium condition
Heath and Ku [13] introduced the HKPE condition for a subclass of risk mea-
sures and called it the Pareto equilibrium condition. They showed the equiva-
lence between HKPE and the non-emptyness of the intersection of the relative
interiors of agents’ sets of priors (see their proposition 4.2). They however did
not address the question of existence of Pareto optima and equilibria in the
sense of definitions 2 and 3. The next theorem which contains the main result
of the paper, may be viewed as an elaboration of Heath and Ku’s [13] propo-
sition 4.2. It establishes that HKPE is a sufficient condition for existence of a
Pareto allocation or equivalently of an equilibrium for monetary utilities.
Theorem 1 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then the following are equivalent:
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1. ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅,
2. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wn, with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i
and all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i,
3. Any attainable allocation is P-Pareto optimal.
Any of the previous assertions imply any of the following assertions:
4. there exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation,
5. there exists an equilibrium.
The equivalence between 2 and 3 follows from the definition of P-Pareto
optima, that between 1 and 2 is proven in lemma 1 below. 5 implies 4 follows
from the first welfare theorem. In the remainder of the paper, we shall provide
two types of proofs for 1 implies 4 or 5. The first uses the sup-convolution, the
second builds on general equilibrium techniques.
Lemma 1 Let (P i)mi=1 be a family of convex sets of probabilities. Then the
following are equivalent:
1. ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅,
2. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wn, with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i
and all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i.
Proof : We first have that ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅ iff cone ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅, equivalently iff
cone ∩
i
ri P i = ∩
i
cone ri(P i) = ∩
i
ri cone(P i) 6= ∅,
the last equality following from Rockafellar’s [20] corollary 6.6.1. Let (f i)mi=1
be a family of convex functions with domain ri coneP i for i = 1, . . . ,m. From
Rockafellar’s [20] corollary 16.2.2, the condition ∩
i
ri cone P i 6= ∅ is equivalent
to the inexistence of a feasible trade (Zi)mi=1 such that∑
i
sup
pi∈P i,λi≥0
λiEpii(Z
i) ≤ 0 (6)
∑
i
sup
pi∈P i,λi≥0
λiEpii(−Zi) > 0 (7)
Since (6) is equivalent to Epii(Zi) ≤ 0, for all i and pi ∈ P i, ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅ is thus
equivalent to the inexistence of a feasible trade (Zi)mi=1 such that Epii(Z
i) ≤
0, for all i and pi ∈ P i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i which is
assertion 2.
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Corollary 1 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for all i and P i be independent of i. Then there
exists an individually rational Pareto optimal allocation and an equilibrium.
Proof : Let P denote the common set of priors. Since P is convex, ri P 6= ∅.
3.2 Sup-convolution
We now provide a proof based on the sup-convolution. This approach to efficient
sharing has been used by Barrieu and El Karoui [4], Filipovic and Kupper
[8], Jouini et al [14], Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [6] in an infinite dimensional
framework.
As is well known, from the monetary invariance, an attainable allocation is
Pareto optimal for aggregate endowment E if and only if it solves the following
problem:
sup
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi) subject to
m∑
i=1
Xi = E.
ForX ∈ Rk, letiV i(X) = sup
{
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi),
m∑
i=1
Xi = X
}
be the sup-convolution
of the V i. Since V i is finite for every i, iV i(X) > −∞ and dom iV i = Rk if
and only if ∩
i
dom ci = ∩
i
P i 6= ∅. In that case, iV i is a monetary utility (the
representative agent’s utility when aggregate endowment is X) and iV i and∑m
i=1 c
i are conjuguate. Furthermore, from Rockafellar’s theorem 16.4 [20], a
sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm) is that
∩
i
ri dom ci = ∩
i
ri P i 6= ∅. (8)
We have thus proven that assertion 1 in theorem 1 implies assertion 4. Let
us now show, that assertion 4 implies existence of an equilibrium. The proof
provided does not use a fixed point theorem, contrary to the standard proofs
of existence.
Let us first remark that pi ∈ ∂iV i(X) iff pi ∈ ∩
i
∂V i(Xi) for any Pareto
optimum (X1, . . . , Xm) associated with X. Indeed,
pi ∈ ∂iV i(X) iff iV i(X) =
m∑
i=1
ci(pi) + Epi(X).
Since iV i(X) =
∑m
i=1 V
i(Xi) for any Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm) associ-
ated with X and ci(pi) + Epi(Xi) − V i(Xi) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ 4, we obtain that
V i(Xi) = ci(pi) + Epi(Xi) for all i, equivalently, pi ∈ ∩
i
∂V i(Xi).
Therefore, a pair ((X∗i)mi=1, p
∗) ∈ A × Rk\{0} is a contingent Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium, when aggregate endowment is E iff
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1. (X∗i)mi=1 is Pareto optimal,
2. p∗ ∈ λ∂iV i(E) for some λ > 0,
3. p∗ ·X∗i = p∗ · Ei for all i.
As remarked by Filipovic and Kupper [8], given a Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm)
and any p ∈ λ∂iV i(E), we have that (X1+p · (E1−X1), . . . , Xm+p · (Em−
Xm), p) is an equilibrium. Indeed, (X1+p ·(E1−X1), . . . , Xm+p ·(Em−Xm))
is Pareto optimal since
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi + p · (Ei −Xi)) =
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi) +
m∑
i=1
p · (Ei −Xi) =
m∑
i=1
V i(Xi)
since (X1, . . . , Xm) is attainable. By construction p fulfills assertion 2 and
p · (Xi + p · (Ei −Xi)) = p · Ei for all i.
3.3 Necessary conditions for existence
Theorem 1 provides sufficient conditions for existence of efficient allocations
(or of an equilibrium). We next give necessary conditions for existence of an
efficient allocation .
Proposition 1 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. If there exists an efficient alloca-
tion, then
1. ∩
i
P i 6= ∅,
2. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . , Wn fulfilling Epi(W i) > 0 for all
pi ∈ P i and for all i.
Proof : To prove assertion one, if X∗ is efficient, then for every i, there exists
λi > 0, such that ∩iλiδV i(Xi∗) 6= ∅. As δV i(Xi∗) ⊆ P i, for each i, there exists
pii ∈ P i such that λipii is independent of i. Hence λi and pii are independent of
i and pi ∈ ∩
i
P i 6= ∅ as was to be proven. To show the second, if there exists a
feasible trade W 1, . . . , Wn fulfilling Epi(W i) > 0 for all pi ∈ P i and for all i,
then V i(Xi +W i) > V i(Xi) for all i contradicting the existence of an efficient
allocation
Remark 1 1. Assertions 1 and 2 of proposition 1 are weaker than assertions
1 and 2 of theorem 1.
2. If V i is coherent for any i, then P i is convex compact for any i. From
Samet [21], assertions 1 and 2 of proposition 1 are then equivalent.
Let us consider the expected utility case with a common prior.
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Corollary 2 Let V i fulfill (4 ) for each i. Let P i = {pii} for all i. Then there
exists an equilibrium if and only if pii is independent of i.
Proof : The sufficient condition follows from corollary 1 while the necessary
condition follows from proposition 1.
4 Relation with equilibrium with short-selling
In this section, we provide an alternate proof of existence of an equilibrium
based on equilibrium with short-selling techniques. We thus recall a number
of standard concepts. We first define and characterize for monetaries utilities
the useful and useless trading directions. We next define the concept of weak
no-arbitrage price as a price giving strictly positive value to any useful and not
useless vector. We finally show that HKPE is the concept of collective absence
of arbitrage introduced by Hart [12].
4.1 Useful vectors
Let C ⊆ Rk be a non-empty convex set. The asymptotic cone of C is the set
{W ∈ Rk | X + λW ∈ C, for all X ∈ C and λ ≥ 0}.
Let V be a monetary utility and X ∈ Rk. Let
Q̂(X) = {Y ∈ Rk | V (Y ) ≥ V (X)}
be the preferred set at X and let R(X) be its asymptotic cone. Since V is
concave, by Rockafellar’s theorem 8.7 in [20], R(X) is independent of X and
will simply be denoted by R. It is called the set of useful vectors for V in the
economic literature. We thus have
R =
{
W ∈ Rk | V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0
}
.
The lineality space of V or set of useless vectors is defined by
L = {W ∈ Rk |V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ∈ R} = R ∩ (−R).
We first characterize R and L.
Proposition 2 We have
R = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P}
L = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) = 0, for all pi ∈ P}
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Proof : Let W fulfill Epi(W ) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P . Then
V (λW ) = min
pi∈P
Epi(λW ) + c(pi) ≥ min
pi∈P
c(pi) = V (0) for all λ ≥ 0
which implies that W ∈ R. Conversely, let W ∈ R. Then
V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0,
hence Epi(λW ) + c(pi) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0, pi ∈ P . For a fixed pi ∈ P , the
map from R+ into R, λ→ λEpi(W )) is bounded below, hence Epi(W ) ≥ 0. The
other assertion is straightforward.
In the following subsections, Ri and Li will denote respectively the set of
useful and useless vectors for agent i.
4.2 Concepts of absence of arbitrage
A no-arbitrage price for agent i is a price giving strictly positive value to any
useful vector for i. As the existence of a no-arbitrage price for i is incompatible
with the existence of a useless vector for i, we use a weaker no-arbitrage concept
due to Werner [22].
Definition 4 A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ” weak no-arbitrage price” for agent
i if p ·W > 0 for all W ∈ Ri\ Li. A price vector p ∈ Rk is a ”weak no-arbitrage
price” for the economy if it is a weak no-arbitrage price for each agent.
The polar of A is defined by A0 = {p ∈ Rp | p ·X ≤ 0, for all X ∈ A}.
Let Siw denote the set of weak no arbitrage prices for i and ∩iSiw the set of
weak no arbitrage prices for the economy. We have:
Proposition 3 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then
1. Siw = ri− (Ri)0 = cone ri P i.
2. The set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is ∩iSiw = cone ∩i ri P i.
Proof : From proposition 2, Ri = {W ∈ Rk | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P i}.
From Allouch et al, lemma 2, Siw = ri− (Ri)0. Therefore
Siw = ri − (Ri)0 = ri cl cone P i = ri cone P i = cone riP i, (9)
the third and fourth equalities following from Rockafellar’s [20] theorem 6.3 and
corollary 6.6.1. Hence the set of weak no arbitrage prices for the economy is
∩iSiw = ∩icone (riP i) = cone ∩i riP i.
We now turn to a concept of collective absence of arbitrage introduced by
Hart [12] which requires that any utility nondecreasing feasible trade be useless.
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Definition 5 The economy satisfies the Weak No-Market-Arbitrage condition
(WNMA) if
∑
iW
i = 0 and W i ∈ Ri for all i implies W i ∈ Li, for all i.
The following proposition follows directly from proposition 2.
Proposition 4 Let V i fulfill (4) for each i. Then the economy satisfies WNMA
if there exists no feasible trades W 1, . . . ,Wn with Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i
and all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i.
HKPE is therefore the same concept as WNMA.
Let us now prove theorem 1. Assertion 1 implies 5 follows from Allouch et
al [1] theorems 4 and 5, assertion 5 implies 4 from the first welfare theorem.
Assertion 4 implies 5 was proven in section 3.3.
5 Constraints on exchanges
5.1 The model
Heath and Ku [13], Filipovic and Kupper [8] and Burgert and Ru¨schendorf [6]
have considered constraints on exchanges when agents use measures of risk.
We now assume that trades are only possible in linear subspaces M i ⊆
Rk, 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Agent i has an endowment Ei ∈ M i of contingent claims. The
definitions of attainable, individual rational and Pareto optimal allocations and
equilibria are extended by imposing the constraint that Xi ∈ M i for all i. In
particular, the set of constrained useful vectors for i is defined as
RM
i
= {W ∈M i | V (λW ) ≥ V (0), for all λ ≥ 0}.
Therefore RM
i
= {W ∈ M i | Epi(W ) ≥ 0, for all pi ∈ P} = Ri ∩M i where Ri
is the unconstrained set of useful vectors for i.
5.2 Weak no-arbitrage prices under constraints
For a subset M ⊆ Rk, let M⊥ be its orthogonal. In order to characterize
weak no-arbitrage prices for this new economy, let us first characterize R0
M i
the
polar of the set of constrained useful vectors for i. From Rockafellar’s corollary
16.4.2.,
(RM
i
)0 = cl((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥)
and from Rockafellar’s theorem 6.3 and corollary 6.6.2.
ri (RM
i
)0 = ri cl((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥) = ri ((Ri)0 + (M i)⊥) = ri (Ri)0 + (M i)⊥
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Using Rockafellar’s corollary 6.6.2., we obtain that
∩iSiw = ∩iri (RM
i
)0 = ∩i(riconeP i + (M i)⊥) = ∩icone (riP i + (M i)⊥)
hence,
∩iSiw 6= ∅ iff ∩icone (riP i + (M i)⊥) 6= ∅ (10)
Since (10) is positively homogeneous, let H = {m ∈ Rk | ∑jmj = 1}. The
set of weak no-arbitrage price is non empty if and on if there exists µ ∈ H such
that
µ = λipii +mi⊥
with pii ∈riP i and λi > 0 and mi⊥ ∈ (M i)⊥. The vector µ may be interpreted
as a signed measure and we have
Eµ(Xi) = λiEpii(X
i), for all Xi ∈M i and i (11)
with pii ∈riP i, λi > 0. Hence the restriction of µ to M i is a non-negative
measure proportionnal to a prior in the relative interior of P i. Furthermore,
• if agent i can trade the riskless asset or equivalently if constants belong
to M i, then λi =< µ, 1 >= 1.
• If all agents can trade the riskless asset, then λi is independent of i. (11)
may be rewritten as: there exists a signed measure µ and probabilities pii
in the relative interior of P i for each agent such that
Eµ(Xi) = Epii(X
i), for all Xi ∈M i and i (12)
• If all agents can trade the riskless asset and if M i = Rk for some i, then
µ is a probability measure and (11) holds true.
Remark 2 1. Condition (10) is equivalent to the WNMA condition: there
exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wn, with W i ∈M i for all i and Epi(W i) ≥
0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some i and pi ∈ P i.
2. The condition µ = λipii + mi⊥ for all i is very similar to the condition
one obtains when writing the no-arbitrage condition for finite financial
markets with constraints on portfolios.
Let us summarize the results obtained in a proposition:
Proposition 5 Let V i fulfill (4) and agent’s i trading set be the subspace M i
for each i. Then the following are equivalent:
1. there exists a signed measure µ and positive constants λi and probabilities
pii ∈riP i such that (11) holds true,
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2. there exists no feasible trade W 1, . . . ,Wn, with W i ∈ M i for all i and
Epi(W i) ≥ 0 for all pi ∈ P i and all i with a strict inequality for some i
and pi ∈ P i.
Any of the previous assertions implies the existence of efficient allocations
or of an equilibrium.
The next two examples show that we cannot dispense with the λi, i = 1, . . . ,m
in (11) even if some agent is unconstrained contradicting Heath and Ku’s propo-
sition 5.1 and corollary 5.1.
Example 1
There are two states and three agents. Each agent has a unique probability
over states: agent 1 has probability pi1 = (14 ,
3
4), agent 2 probability pi
2 = (34 ,
1
4)
and agent 3, probability pi3 = (1, 0). Assume that the trading sets are M1 =
{X1 = (x1, x1) | x1 ∈ R}, M2 = {X2 = (x2,−x2) | x2 ∈ R}, M3 = {X3 =
(x3, 0) | x3 ∈ R}. HKPE is fulfilled since RM1 = {W 1 = (w,w) | w ≥ 0},
RM
2
= {W 2 = (w,−w) | w ≥ 0} and RM3 = {W 3 = (w, 0) | w ≥ 0} and∑
iW
i = 0 implies W i = 0 for all i. But there exists no solution µ = (µ1, µ2)
to the following system:
Eµ(X1) = (µ1 + µ2)x1 = Epi1(X
1) = x1, for all x1 ∈ R,
Eµ(X2) = (µ1 − µ2)x2 = Epi2(X2) = 1/2x2, for all x2 ∈ R,
Eµ(X3) = µ1x3 = Epi3(X
3) = x3, for all x3 ∈ R.
since the first and the third equations imply µ1 = 1, µ2 = 0 which is incompat-
ible with the second equation.
Example 2.
There are three agents. The state space and the probabilities are as in Example
1 as well as the trading sets of agents 1 and 2. The trading set of agent 3 is
M3 = R2. Hence, RM3 = {W 3 = (w31, w32) | w31 ≥ 0}. As in the previous
example, HKPE is fulfilled. However, there exists no solution µ = (µ1, µ2) to
(11) with λi = 1 for all i.
This last example provides a counter-example to Heath and Ku’s corollary 5.2.
When there are constraints, we loose the equivalence between assertions 1 and
2 of theorem 1.
Example 3.
The state space and the probabilities are as in Example 1, the trading sets are
M1 = M2 = M3 = {(x, x) | x ∈ R}. Since RM1 = RM2 = RM3 = {(w,w) |
w ≥ 0}, HKPE is fulfilled but the intersection of the sets of priors is empty.
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5.3 Sup-convolution and constraints
Assuming to simplify that agents can all trade the riskless asset, let us return
to the inf-convolution’s approach. Define for each i
VM
i
(X) =
{
V i(X) if X ∈M i
−∞, otherwise (13)
The function VM
i
: Rk → R ∪ {−∞} is concave, upper semi-continuous, cash
invariant but fails to be monotone. We may still use duality methods but the
domain of the conjuguate function is larger than the probability simplex. Let
m ∈ Rk and
cM
i
(m) = sup
X∈Rk
VM
i
(X)− < m,X >= sup
X∈M i
VM
i
(X)− < m,X > (14)
be the conjuguate of VM
i
. Clearly we have
cM
i
(m+m⊥) = cM
i
(m), for all m⊥ ∈ (M i)⊥ (15)
From the cash invariance of VM
i
, we also have
cM
i
(m) = sup
X∈M i, a∈R
VM
i
(X)− < m,X > +a(1− < m, 1 >)
therefore cM
i
(m) =∞ if 1 6=< m, 1 >. Defining H = {m ∈ Rk | ∑jmj = 1},
we thus have that dom cM
i ⊆ H. For m ∈ P i, cM i(m) ≤ ci(m) <∞. Hence
dom cM
i
= (P i + (M i)⊥) ∩H
The function iVM
i
<∞ if and only if ∩
i
dom cM
i
= ∩
i
(P i+(M i)⊥)∩H 6= ∅.
In that case, since iVM
i
> −∞ on ∑iM i, dom iVM i 6= ∅ and iVM i is
proper, henceiVM
i
and
∑m
i=1 c
M i are conjuguate. From Rockafellar’s theorem
16.4 [20], a sufficient condition for existence of a Pareto optimum (X1, . . . , Xm)
is that
∩
i
ri dom cM
i
= ∩
i
(ri (P i) + (M i)⊥) ∩H 6= ∅. (16)
We are thus back to the weak no-arbitrage condition (10).
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